Accounting for the universalistic and contingency perspectives : the transfer of ‘best practice’ in a Brazilian company. by Geary,  J. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
16 August 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Geary, J. and Aguzzoli, R. and Lengler, J. (2016) 'Accounting for the universalistic and contingency
perspectives : the transfer of `best practice' in a Brazilian company.', BAM 2016: Thriving in Turbulent
Times. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 6-8 September 2016.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.bam.ac.uk/civicrm/event/info?id=3013
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Accounting for the Universalistic and Contingency Perspectives: The Transfer of 
‘Best Practice’ in a Brazilian company 
 
Abstract 
This study examines how a Brazilian MNCs source and diffuse ‘best practices’. We 
explore the case of a Brazilian MNC with operations in Switzerland, Norway, UK and 
Canada. We draw on two theoretical frameworks – the universalistic and contingency 
perspectives. We find that the case MNC imposed a unitary (US-sourced) model of HR on 
all of its subsidiaries regardless of the countries in which they were located, the stage of 
the production process, or the extent to which local workforces sought to resist the model’s 
imposition. In explaining our findings we argue that the universalistic and contingency 
perspectives are not in opposition but are in fact complementary. We are critical of 
reductionist depictions which point either towards increasing convergence à la the 
universalistic perspective or the resilience of diversity as found in the contingency 
perspective. Still, lines of differentiation can be identified and our findings point to 
discernible patterns of convergence both within MNCs and within sectors across countries, 
and the likelihood of divergence across MNCs and sectors within countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we address the question of how do MNCs from Brazil share their best HRM 
practices and transfer them between headquarters and subsidiaries. We address this 
important question by examining the case of a very significant Brazilian MNC with 
operations in four mature western economies (Switzerland, Norway, UK and Canada) 
whose labor and employment systems vary greatly. We draw on two theoretical 
frameworks – the universalistic and contingency perspectives – to account for whether and 
by what means and with effects the case MNC sought to diffuse ‘best practice’.  
 
We find that the institutional context from which the case MNC emerged had a clear and 
discernible effect on its management style and, in turn, on the manner in which its HR 
practices were diffused and implemented in its foreign subsidiaries. The HR practices 
themselves, however, were not of Brazilian origin but were rather sourced in the US. We 
thus identify a unique amalgam of practices and style of management which bore a similar 
hue in each of the four case countries and which critically came to override host country 
institutional impediments and constraints.  
 
We argue that the universalistic and contingency perspectives are not in opposition but are 
in fact complementary. We find that management are motivated to identify, and choose to 
adopt, ‘best practice’, but outcomes at subsidiary level – whether they lean towards 
management’s strategic objectives, as in this case study, or not – are shaped also by the 
institutional and socio-political context of the firm. In sum, we argue that we need to take 
account of management’s motivations, the economic context of the firm, management’s 
endeavors to make economically rational decisions, along with locating those motivations 
and decisions within the broader social and political context of the MNC’s home country 
and the country-of-operation of its foreign subsidiaries. Finally, we are critical of 
reductionist depictions which point either towards increasing convergence à la the 
universalistic perspective or the resilience of diversity as found in the contingency 
perspective. The reality is often more complex; there is evidence of both. Still, lines of 
differentiation can be identified and our findings point to discernible patterns of 
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convergence both within MNCs and within sectors across countries, and the likelihood of 
divergence across MNCs and sectors within countries. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There are two dominant views in the international HR literature in respect of the diffusion 
of ‘best practice’. The universalistic perspective suggests that ‘best practice’ is universally 
valid and can be applied regardless of the local environment (Huselid, 1995; Pudelko and 
Harzing, 2007). The contingency perspective disagrees and argues that policies and 
practices are thus seen to be ‘localized’; that is, adapted to suit the local context and to 
marry with local traditions and norms (Björkman and Budhwar, 2007).  
 
The universalistic perspective argues that managements are continually on the look-out for 
practices that will bestow a competitive advantage over competitors. Benchmarking is a 
common device by which they might compare their practices and their organizational 
performance with that of other companies, often by relying on the expertise of external 
consultants. In such circumstances, the national origin of ‘best practice’ has little bearing. 
The advantage of diffusing ‘best practices’ across the MNC is that not only are they 
deemed to be ‘the best’ in the sense they are acclaimed to work, but they also reduce 
organizational complexity (Christmann, 2004), time and effort in experimenting with a 
variety of practices (Edwards and Ferner, 2002), help in the establishment of a common 
corporate culture or value system as well as serving as an aid with the global integration of 
business operations and the delivery or provision of standardized products and services 
across different countries (Edwards et al., 2007; Ferner et al., 2005). In essence, they 
enhance managerial control. 
 
This universalistic perspective might also be linked with the concept of dominance as 
illustrated for example in Smith and Meiksins’ (1995) work. Here ‘best practice’ is deemed 
to be ‘best’ by its association with leading firms from hegemonic or dominant national 
business systems (NBSs), such as US-based MNCs. In turn, its transmission or emulation 
is particularly likely to occur in MNCs which originate in ‘lesser’ or subordinate NBSs 
where specialized managerial competencies are lacking (Kuruvilla et al., 2003; Pudelko 
and Harzing, 2007).  
 
A dominance effect may also be evident at a sectoral level, such that the practices of a 
leading firm may come to be emulated by other competing firms within the same sector 
(Royle, 2006). It may also be that some countries’ firms may come to attain a dominant 
position within certain industries. In such circumstances, ‘best practice’ may assume a 
particular sectoral configuration such that we come to witness a convergence of practices 
around a shared sense of what is ‘best’ within sectors but otherwise divergence of practices 
across sectors; a process which Katz and Darbishire (2000) have referred to as “converging 
divergences”.  
 
The assumption that MNCs will want to standardize their HR practices or that such 
strategies would lead to convergence in HR practices internationally has been subject to 
much criticism (Gerhart, 2005). An alternative perspective, which we label the contingency 
perspective, gives emphasis to a variety of factors which might constrain such a process. 
Among the most significant is the influence of local institutional constraints and the extent 
to which they are marshalled by local actors in limiting the preferences of MNCs’ 
management. With this perspective HR practices are seen to be deeply wedded to 
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particular institutional structures, legacies and cultural preferences, and are difficult to 
alter, at least in the short term (Farndale and Paauwe, 2007; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). 
Thus emphasis is given to the possibility of divergence in practices across the units of a 
MNC (Colbert, 2004).  
 
The tension between host and home country institutional influences is widely recognized in 
the international literature to be most acutely felt by those MNCs whose home country 
practices diverge significantly from practice and traditions of the host economy (Edwards 
and Kuruvilla, 2005; Tempel et al., 2006). Such potential for conflict may require a MNC’s 
headquarters to consider giving local management discretion as to how to best configure 
the host country’s subsidiaries’ practices (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005). Where this 
occurs, the quest for external legitimacy (or local responsiveness) in the host country is 
often said to triumph over management’s quest for internal consistency (or global 
integration) within the MNC (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). The greater the institutional 
“distance” (Kostova, 1999) between the host country and the MNC’s home country the less 
likely, it is argued, that common ‘best practice’ will be diffused successfully (Harzing and 
Sorge, 2003; Taylor et al., 1996).  
 
Fundamentally, transfer process is not solely determined by the rational prescriptions of 
corporate management, but is rather shaped by “the interplay of interests and the 
possession and deployment of power resources by a variety of actors” (Ferner and Tempel, 
2006: 31).  
 
From this review of the literature, a series of questions are begged. These are: to what 
extent do MNCs from BRICS countries draw on their national business systems to develop 
their preferred best HR practices? Might it be the case that in the absence of a rich 
repository of indigenous expertise they are compelled to look beyond their own national 
boundaries for expertise and guidance? What then can be said of the ‘national pedigree’ of 
such adopted practices; and to what extent, and for what reasons, are they blended with 
home country and host country practices? These are important questions but remain to date 
relatively under-explored in the international literature.  
 
3. The Brazilian institutional context 
Business systems in Latin America have been portrayed in a stylized manner by Schneider 
(2013) as constituting hierarchical market economies (HMEs). HMEs are characterized by 
the dominance of diversified business groups, the significant presence of foreign MNCs, a 
dearth of investment in education and training, fragmented labor relations, weak 
(workplace) trade unions, and large informal labor markets. Their highly centralized and 
hierarchical style of management is seen to be rooted in two influences: first, in a long 
tradition of state intervention in labor markets that had the effect of dissuading employers 
from conducting bilateral negotiations with unions and instead inclined them to pursue 
their interests directly with the state; and second in the predominance of a small number of 
large companies – many in family ownership and mainly MNCs – that dominate their 
given sectors (Hopewell, 2014; Ribeiro, 1995). 
 
Brazilian style of management relies on informal institutions and personal relationships 
(Ribeiro, 1995) rather than on formal institutions as observed in mature economies (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). Local scholars acknowledge that traditional styles of management 
have been tempered in recent years, especially in large well-resourced Brazilian companies 
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which possess the means to import ‘best practice’ – mainly from the US – either by 
recruiting from leading business schools or by availing of the expertise of US-based 
management consultancy firms (Chu and Wood, 2008; Fleury and Fleury, 2006). 
 
The management of HQ-subsidiary relations within Brazilian MNCs is characterized in the 
literature as being highly integrated with subsidiaries possessing limited local autonomy 
and particularly in respect of HRM policy (Muritiba et al., 2012).  
 
4. The host countries’ institutional contexts   
In order to understand how the institutional environments of mature market economies 
might constrain or resource MNCs in adopting models of HR ‘best practice’ we distinguish 
between host countries’ varieties of labor market regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Switzerland and Norway were chosen as examples of ‘co-ordinated market economies’ 
(CMEs), and Canada and the United Kingdom as ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs). 
 
Switzerland is a ‘soft’ or ‘liberal’ variant of a CME (Börsch, 2008). Trade unions are 
relatively weak and the state’s regulatory capacity is more limited than that of other 
European countries arising from the country’s canton structure. Labor law is restrained in 
its reach and most aspects of employment regulation are governed by collective 
agreements. Norway’s institutional environment is highly coordinated and regulated. Its 
trade unions are strong and there is considerable government intervention in the field of 
employment relations (Dølvik and Stokke, 1998; Dølvik, 2007). The labor market is 
characterized by strict employment protection (Büsch et al., 2009), and it is politically 
difficult for the government to unilaterally institute structural reforms in the labor market 
allowing trade unions to exert some considerable influence on the management of 
companies (Gooderham et al., 1999). 
 
In Canada labor markets are relatively deregulated. Relations between employers and 
unions have traditionally been portrayed as being adversarial or arm’s-length with unions 
earnestly defending their right to bargain for their members’ terms and conditions of 
employment with employers striving to protect their right to manage and implement 
organizational changes as they might deem appropriate (Godard, 2009). Although union 
density has held up relatively well in recent years (30%), it has declined more noticeably in 
some sectors, including mining (22%) (Galarneau and Sohn, 2013). The UK is 
characterized as a liberal state with deregulated labor and capital markets with low levels 
of state intervention and business co-ordination (Howell, 2007). Both the UK and Canada 
are also regarded in the literature as being particularly open to the importation of novel 
HRM practices, which is attributed to their long history of hosting MNCs, particularly 
from the US (Ferner et al., 2013). 
 
5. The case company and its case subsidiaries 
The case company, here called BrazilCo, is a very large and significant Brazilian MNC. It 
has more than 140,000 workers at home and overseas and is extremely profitable. In 2009 
its market value was US$150 billion; its net income was around US$30 billion from 2010 
to 2013. It had sales of around US$90 billion in this period. With operations in almost 40 
countries, it is possible for the company to source production from other facilities. 
BrazilCo was state-owned until 1997. Since then it grew significantly through foreign 
acquisitions. Its headquarters remains in Brazil as are over 60 per cent of its assets and 80 
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per cent of its workforce. Its board of directors is composed mainly of Brazilian nationals. 
It is a dominant player in a number of sector segments in which it operates.  
 
BrazilCo’s Canadian and UK operations were acquired in 2006 through the acquisition of a 
Canadian-owned mining and refining MNC, which we label CanadaCo. It had over 5,000 
workers employed in four mining and refining plants and in one regional office. While 
Canada accounted for 47 per cent of CanadaCo’s revenues pre-acquisition, post-acquisition 
it represented a mere 4 per cent of BrazilCo’s revenues. Union density at BrazilCo’s 
Canadian operations was 70 per cent and union representatives exercised considerable 
influence over management decision-making in respect of work organization, reward 
systems and pay levels. The BrazilCo’s British refinery employed 260 workers, and while 
over half of its workers were union members, the union exercised little, if any, influence 
over management.  
 
BrazilCo entered Norway through acquiring a former state-owned facility that had been 
closed for a number of years. The Norwegian refinery, which was located in the north of 
the country, employed 78 workers, most of whom were re-recruited from the staff of the 
former company. Union density was very high (90 per cent). It was of modest strategic 
significance to BrazilCo since it accounted for a mere 1 per cent of the MNC’s overall 
revenues. The Swiss subsidiary was established in 2006 as a regional hub. It was 
responsible for tax, risk assessment, marketing and sales, budgeting and production, as 
well as the implementation of policies and practices emanating from the Brazilian 
headquarters in the company’s European and Middle Eastern operations. It employed 89 
workers, only 15 of whom were Swiss. There was no trade union or works council present 
in the facility. 
 
Three of the four countries’ subsidiaries are located in peripheral areas. The local 
communities were very reliant on the company’s investment and employment. This 
dependence was greater in Canada. In two localities, BrazilCo employed almost 65 per 
cent of the local workforce. Local unemployment was also high. In Canada it varied 
between 7 and 11 per cent, and in the UK and Norway it was 8 and 7 per cent respectively. 
Unemployment levels were, by comparison, considerably lower in Switzerland. 
 
6. Research Methodology 
The data derive from in-depth semi-structured interviews. Preliminary interviews were 
conducted in July 2009 with two HR global managers in the company’s corporate 
headquarters in Brazil. Between July 2009 and February 2011 a further 49 interviews were 
undertaken, mainly among senior management. Of these, 16 were conducted in Brazil, 8 in 
Switzerland, 12 in Canada, 8 in Norway, and 7 in the UK. These were supplemented by e-
mail communications, usually to seek clarification on matters raised during the interviews. 
After conducting a preliminary analysis of the data, additional telephone interviews were 
conducted with two corporate HR human resource managers in Brazil in January 2013. 
These interviews were conducted for a number of purposes: to ‘road-test’ our first 
conclusions, to fill gaps in the data collection, and to derive an update on developments in 
the transfer of practices to the four subsidiaries. Excluding these latter interviews and four 
other interviews (one each in Switzerland, Canada, UK, and Brazil) all were tape-recorded, 
giving a total of over thirty-six hours recording. All were transcribed by one of the authors. 
Interviews were conducted in Portuguese with Brazilian staff and in English with non-
Brazilian interviewees. In the case of the Swiss and Canadian subsidiaries, expatriate 
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managers were also interviewed. In Brazil, the former corporate HR Director was 
interviewed in an effort to confirm the testimonies given by current executives. Trade 
union and staff representatives were interviewed in Brazil (CUT, Força Sindical, and 
UGT), Norway (LO), Canada (USW), and the UK (Unite) in order to understand the role 
and influence these actors might have played in shaping local HR practices.  
 
Every reasonable effort was made to conduct the interviews until data saturation was 
reached (Guest et al., 2006), and verification was sought through secondary sources of 
data. A diverse range of documentary sources  was used, including various books on 
BrazilCo’s history, annual reports (from 1942 to 2011), internal communications, a 
documentary, as well as articles in Veja and Folha de São Paulo from 1968 to 2012. The 
latter are Brazil’s leading and most respected magazine and newspaper titles. In 
Switzerland, we reviewed articles in various press media (Le Temps and Tribune de 
Genève) from 1998 to 2012 that referred to our case company. In Norway we reviewed 
LO, NHO and government documentation. In Canada we examined articles from the 
Toronto Star and The Sudbury Star from 1985 to 2011, and in the UK various collective 
agreements and articles from the Western Mail and South Wales Evening Post from 1980 
to 2011.  
 
The data obtained from the interviews and the aforementioned secondary data sources were 
transposed into a computer file to enable a deductive content analysis. The data analysis 
was conducted in two steps. First the material was reviewed in their original languages: 
Portuguese and English. It was feared that translating the interviews and secondary data 
into only one of those languages – at least at an early point in the research – could lead to 
misunderstandings (Xian, 2008). No computer-aided software was used. Instead, a 
qualitative form of content analysis was conducted (Krippendorff, 2004), in which the 
sentence was the basic unit of analysis related by key words grouped as categories to 
produce a ‘cluster’. After a first categorization the key materials were translated into 
English through the following procedure: they were translated by one author who speaks 
Portuguese and English and proofread by an English native speaker. Then, they were given 
to the Brazilian researcher for a back translation (Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997). When 
the original and the back translation diverged, a discussion to resolve any anomalies was 
conducted with the English and Portuguese native speakers.  
 
Three aggregate dimensions were identified: country-of-origin, BrazilCo in the host 
country, and the implementation of HR ‘best practice’. In order to confirm the internal 
consistency of the data analysis and the reliability of the identified categories, the files 
were coded twice by the same researcher, a process which Krippendorff (2004) has termed 
‘stability reliability’. No significant differences were found with each categorization.  
 
The study’s preliminary findings were returned to the company for ‘member-checking’ in 
two phases. First, they were reviewed with the global HRM director in a face-to-face 
interview, over the phone with the Swiss and Canadian HRM managers, and subsequently 
in January 2013 (as indicated above) with corporate HR management. Then, a draft report 
was sent to management in Brazil, Switzerland, Norway, Canada and the UK for factual 
verification.  
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7. Findings 
BrazilCo is a very centralized and command MNC. The centralization of decision-making 
at headquarters was also accompanied by the importation of particular bureaucratic control 
mechanisms which were considered to be ‘best practice’. They were developed primarily 
in association with American consultancy firms, including Accenture, McKinsey, Boston 
Consultant Group (BCG), Booz Allen, Ernest & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC): “We use consultancies. There is a technical analysis 
behind it (the practice). There are several well-known international consultancies which 
globally assist us. They search the market for what we need to do”. (Middle Brazilian 
manager).  
Such was the extent of US consultancies’ firms involvement in BrazilCo that they were 
frequently observed “as being part” of the company’s structure. Virtually all departments 
worked with external consultants in the development and implementation of different 
projects: “When you import the American mainstream you are standardizing your 
company to that (imported) tradition… it is something like a cookie cutter” (Middle 
Brazilian manager). 
 
With the consultancy firms’ help, Brazilian management worked to bring together their 
various HR policies to develop a so-called “global HR model”, which was then cascaded 
down to each subsidiary via the regional divisions. Ultimately, the identification and 
diffusion of (US) ‘best practice’ was intended to permit BrazilCo to standardize its 
procedures and policies across the MNC:  
The key point [in the implementation of the global model] was to identify 
the ‘lowest common denominator’ of a policy and not to give in under any 
circumstance (Brazilian former director). 
The company’s global HR policy gave particular focus to the role performed by line 
managers. For each of the management levels there were specific ‘trails of 
development’. The company also had a global career and succession policy which 
facilitated global internal recruitment and promotion.  
 
BrazilCo saw itself as a ‘meritocracy’, rewarding employees who demonstrated superior 
performance. Its pay-for-performance system which applied to all its subsidiaries was 
based on three different elements: company (25 per cent), department (25 per cent), and 
individual (50 per cent) performance. However, the proportion of employees’ remuneration 
which was comprised of pay-for-performance was permitted to vary between countries 
depending on local practice and traditions. That being said, each subsidiary was expected 
to adopt an “aggressive” (in management’s words) approach such that a significant 
proportion of an employee’s annual salary was variable: “BrazilCo has this aggressive 
attitude regarding pay-for-performance… Sometimes it is not well accepted in other 
cultures, but we still implement it” (Middle Brazilian manager). 
 
7.1 The transfer of ‘best practice’ to BrazilCo’ subsidiaries 
7.1.1 Canada 
Upon acquiring CanadaCo, BrazilCo moved all of its former HQ functions from Toronto to 
Rio de Janeiro. It then transferred its global HR model to Canada which was perceived 
locally as “thou shalt” implement it without question.  
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The Canadian managers also acknowledged that BrazilCo made extensive use of 
consultancy firms, such as McKinsey, Accenture, and PwC, and that the policies had been 
‘benchmarked’ against leading international companies. Interviewees confirmed that the 
HR policies had not been developed by Canadians: “I have been told no policies would 
come from here (Canada); policies come from Brazil and are to be implemented here” 
(Middle Canadian manager). Their introduction and implementation gave rise to tensions 
and difficulties among staff, but the prevailing view among management was that it was 
best to accept these policies. 
The programs for management training were well-received by higher levels of 
management. They particularly appreciated the career and succession planning program 
and the manner in which feedback and talent mapping was produced.  
Special emphasis is given to the manner in which the pay-for-performance policy was 
introduced. They claimed they were unsure and uncertain as to how it would work in 
practice, and despite requesting that they be given the time to discuss and debate its merits, 
they had no influence over its implementation. This created feelings of distrust among the 
managers: 
Where the gap exists is in the implementation and execution. They try to 
copy (international ‘best practice’), but the implementation is different. 
They know how to implement in Brazil. Now, how to implement things in a 
different cultural setting is a challenge (Senior Canadian Manager). 
The introduction of new payment and pension policies form manual workers in the mines 
and refineries involved changes to the bonus scheme, which had been linked to the market 
price for nickel and a shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution pension plan. 
BrazilCo wished to reform this plan and introduce a new pay-for-performance scheme. 
This was to allow for 70 per cent of workers’ annual earnings to be fixed and the 
remaining 30 per cent to be determined by performance (24%) and the price of nickel 
(6%).  
 
In July 2009, following attempts by management to negotiate a new collective agreement, 
the miners rejected the proposal. A subsequent strike lasted for up to 18 months. When the 
workers abandoned their action, BrazilCo proceeded to introduce their new pay-for-
performance policy and to change the retirement pension scheme as originally planned, 
although they made a slight adjustment to the former by increasing the nickel price bonus 
component from 6 per cent to 8 per cent and reducing the pay-for-performance component 
from 24 per cent to 22 per cent.  
 
7.1.2 The UK 
Under CanadaCo’s management, the British subsidiary had enjoyed considerable 
autonomy to decide on its own HR policies and practices. Post-acquisition the Brazilian 
management extended their “command and control style of management” to the UK. 
British managers observed both the shift in the locus of power and the influence of 
consultancy firms: “BrazilCo is run by consultancy firms” (Middle British manager).  
 
In order to ensure that the necessary systems and procedures were put in place, the HQ had 
an implementation team put in place which was described to us as a team which “pushed 
from behind”. Although managers conceded that, in a company like BrazilCo, a 
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standardization of policies is important in order to have a better understanding about what 
each operation is meant to be doing and how, their implementation and execution was 
perceived to be problematic. There was little, if any, room for discussion or consultation.  
 
There was a perception in the UK that with the standardization of HR policies, the role of 
local management had been diluted such that they thought of themselves as being only 
responsible for implementation and conveying information and reports to HQ. Many, too, 
felt that the role of external consultants had become over-bearing. One interviewee 
summed up their influence by saying “I would say there are too many consultants. Let the 
managers manage it”. The company’s career and succession program was implemented. A 
similar performance evaluation system was also introduced for management. Many 
doubted its significance seeing it as “a box-ticking exercise: all the headquarters had is 
your résumé in a computer program”. The tool, nonetheless, was also used to determine 
managers’ bonus pay. The new pay-for-performance policy and defined-contribution 
pension plan was also introduced, but in contrast to Canada, there was no resistance to 
their implementation in the UK. It was perceived by British employees as a significant 
bonus which was not enjoyed by employees in other companies in the locality. They also 
saw themselves as being comparatively well paid.  
There aren’t a lot of other heavy industries in this area. Do you think people 
working in the public sector get 25 per cent bonuses?  (Senior British 
manager).  
 
Further, workers were aware that the company could move its activities to France where 
another subsidiary was located. 
 
7.1.3 Switzerland 
BrazilCo’s global HR model was also transferred to Switzerland and local management 
confirmed that the company made extensive use of international consultants. They also 
reported that they enjoyed little autonomy and felt compelled to adhere to the policies and 
practices as delineated by management at HQ. Many of the ‘best practice’ methods which 
were introduced were well-known to the Swiss managers and were welcomed with the 
exception of pay-for-performance. That apart, they did not see any problem – in theory – in 
adopting the global model and its associated ‘best practice’. A senior manager objected: “It 
is not the system itself, it is the way they asked us to do it”. Swiss managers suggested that 
it would have been better had BrazilCo focused on the process of introducing policies, and 
invited local input in a way which would engage local managers. This, they argued, would 
have helped in the implementation process: “They just sent it out to everyone and said 
‘here you go’” (Middle Swiss manager).  
 
Of the policies introduced, the Swiss managers particularly welcomed the provision of 
leadership and management training, together with the career and succession planning 
program. The latter was seen to be particularly important in retaining key staff a tight 
local labor where alternative job opportunities abounded.  
 
The introduction of pay-for-performance, however, was a different matter. There was 
little or no consultation on the principle of its introduction, although local management 
did prevail on their Brazilian superiors to reduce the variable component from almost 
half of management’s salary to 21 per cent. But even with this reduced variable 
component management still complained that it was too large when compared with the 
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practice of other large companies: “In this market, it is too high, too much of an 
uncertainty ... Particularly the Swiss prefer to be sure what they are getting” (Middle 
Swiss Manager). Nonetheless, the employees felt they had little option but to accept the 
imported pay practices.  
 
7.1.4 Norway 
BrazilCo’s global HR model was also transferred to its Norwegian subsidiary. The 
Norwegian managers acknowledged that the policies and practices were benchmarked 
against ‘best practice’ internationally. In testimony a manager cited their discussions with 
PwC analysts, who told them: “big companies do it like that”. Again the Brazilian HQ was 
seen to be insistent in introducing benchmarked policies and practices, regardless of 
whether they were perceived to suit the Norwegian context: “...but here we have the lack of 
adjustment. That is the problem. It is not the benchmarking itself, but it is the lack of 
adjustment (Senior Norwegian manager). 
 
At the time of the researchers’ fieldwork, the Norwegian subsidiary was implementing the 
company’s career and succession plan. Local managers queried its usefulness in 
discussions with us and complained that it had not been adapted to local practices and 
traditions, but felt their concerns had not been addressed by their superiors in Rio de 
Janeiro. One senior manager said “I like the system although it is not adjusted to our 
needs”.  
 
The implementation of the performance-related pay scheme also raised concerns. Pay-for-
performance policy was first opposed by trade union leaders. “You have to organize your 
life on the assumption of a regular payment, not for this possible peak once a year (Middle 
Norwegian manager). However, corporate management let it be known that the Norwegian 
workers would not receive any salary increase if they continued to oppose the introduction 
of pay-for-performance. At this point, the trade union re-considered its position: “[the 
employees] want to get extra money. If we don’t have the agreement, we don’t get 
anything (Norwegian employee representative). 
 
The policy was introduced in 2006 and the collective negotiations did lead to the variable 
component being significantly reduced. In the case of operators’ annual salary the variable 
component was reduced from 20 per cent to 8 per cent and from 50 per cent to 20 per cent 
in the case of managers’ and engineers’ salaries, and finally to 30 per cent for the CEO.  
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study explores the transfer of HR practices within a Brazilian MNC. In particular we 
explore whether the pattern of diffusion mirrored that as anticipated in the universalistic 
perspective such that MNCs can be expected to seek out and diffuse international ‘best 
practice’ without regard to cultural or national context; or whether, as with the contingency 
perspective, such a scenario is highly unlikely given the variety of social and political 
constraints which might limit such a process at a local level. In an attempt to assess these 
competing claims we examined the diffusion of the case company’s ‘global HR model’ to 
four of its subsidiaries that were located in countries whose labor market and employment 
relations regimes differed substantially.  
 
Our findings reveal that the MNC relied to a very considerable degree on the expertise and 
services of US-based consultancy firms in designing and implementing its policies. Its 
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‘global HR model’ thus assumed a distinct American accent. However we also found that 
it was introduced with a very firm hand by Brazilian management, to the extent that the 
HQ was rarely tolerant of any local questioning of its policies’ merits, or of the manner of 
their implementation.  
 
Thus the major empirical contribution of this study is its illustration of the manner in 
which a complex process (the transfer of ‘best practice’) worked itself out across particular 
levels of influence, including local, sectoral, national and international. We find that a very 
significant MNC from Brazil was determined to transfer the practices it deemed to be 
‘globally best’ to its foreign subsidiaries. We further find that notwithstanding the 
American origin of these practices they were married to a distinctive Brazilian managerial 
ethos which insisted on management’s prerogative to manage. Thus while we argue that 
the practices themselves were not Brazilian in origin and, in this sense bore no discernible 
home country hallmark, we find that the style of management which accompanied their 
transfer to be deeply rooted in Brazil’s national business system.  
 
Thus, the striking finding of this research is the lengths to which the case MNC went to 
impose a unitary model of HR on all of its subsidiaries regardless of the countries in which 
they were located, regardless of the stage of the production process they were involved in 
(extraction, refining, administration or management), or indeed regardless of the extent to 
which local workforces sought to resist or shape the model’s imposition. This is a very 
significant finding especially when placed alongside that of MNCs from advanced 
economies that seek to ‘corporatize’ models of HR in a manner which directly challenges  
indigenous practice and custom. That BrazilCo was willing and able to contest the 
institutional fabric of its host subsidiaries is largely explained by relations of power and 
economic dependence. BrazilCo was a large and dominant player in its sector. Many of its 
operations were located in peripheral regions, in areas of relative disadvantage and high 
unemployment. It held considerable sway over local development agencies, local 
workforces and communities who came to rely on its investment. It was not that local 
management and workforces were devoid of local resources to exert influence over 
BrazilCo’s policies, it was rather the case that they found it difficult to marshall them and 
where they tried, corporate management possessed the means to overcome any local 
resistance.  
We find that our case MNC from an emerging economy worked as a vector (Ferner et al., 
2012) in disseminating ‘best practice’ from a dominant economy and contributed to the 
convergence of managerial practices within its subsidiaries. We further argue that the 
globalization of production together with the attendant integration of supply chains (as 
conceived broadly to include production and managerial practices) was found to enfold 
subsidiaries and their workforces into rationalities other than those prescribed by national 
institutions and customs. Such ‘logics’ facilitated the diffusion of ‘best practice’ from 
dominant societies (the US) via a dominant sectoral firm to economically dependent 
regions and subsidiaries. Thus, we claim that the importation of such ‘foreign’ models 
reduced the specificity of national models of HR. Such external forces operated in tandem 
with social action and power relations within the firm. Advantage leaned towards the 
MNC’s HQ to the extent that the degree to which national contexts mediated and 
conditioned systemic or globalization dynamics was very limited. In such a weakened and 
dependent local context the power of the MNC to diffuse ‘best practice’ was facilitated and 
hastened. In this study the co-existence of dominant-country practices and a dominant 
sectoral firm strengthened the likelihood of the diffusion of similar practices. Such 
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processes where they are replicated across MNCs and sectors can be expected to generate 
further convergence within sectors across countries, but otherwise pluralism and 
eclecticism between sectors and across countries might be the predominant pattern along 
the lines envisaged by Smith and Meiksins (1995) and by Katz and Darbishire’s (2000) in 
their conceptualization of “converging divergences”. Where such patterns are generalized 
national models of employment relations and HR can be expected to fragment further. 
 
These conclusions inevitably point to the current study’s boundaries. This is a study of a 
single MNC from one emerging economy in one specific (sunset) industry at a particular 
point in time. It does however seem likely that as MNCs from other BRICS countries 
globalize and assume positions of dominance in their sectors that they too will seek to 
diffuse their particular brand of ‘best practice’. In this case study the brand of ‘best practice 
combined ‘Brazilian’ hierarchical centralism in a manner consistent with Schneider’s 
(2009) conceptualization of firms originating from HMEs with a distinctively US 
‘management sensibility’ (US-style package of global uniform HR practices). We argue 
that, while this coercive hierarchical style of management is deeply rooted in Brazilian 
culture, its expression in the four case countries was facilitated by a particular pattern of 
economic and political relations. To the degree that other BRICS countries or HME MNCs 
are able to have their way in diffusing their version of ‘best practice’, the question then 
arises as to what extent will they come to act as benchmarks for efficiency for other firms 
within their sector? We have not been able to ask this question in our research, but it is of 
obvious importance to the themes explored here.  
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